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From Diversity to Difference 
Structural Dilemmas of Identity Politics 
CAMIL ALEXANDRU PÂRVU 
 
 
 
In the last decades, we witnessed a substantive and abundant literature on the 
topics of multiculturalism, identity politics, struggles for recognition, or the politics 
of difference, most of these writings connecting or treating these subjects as inte-
grated with the broader aims of justice and political justification. The notions of 
multiculturalism, identity politics or difference politics are either used inter-
changeably, or claimed to be distinct in some of their aspects or implications. They 
are adopted as moral, political ideals, or as grounds for differential policies that fo-
cus on the uniquely important influence that such identities bear on the individ-
ual’s capacity to be an authentic actor of political justification. Whatever the case, 
the positions and arguments developed in the name of these ideals and policies 
claim to widen, broaden the scope of toleration in a way that some liberal democ-
rats consider unwarranted. 
Beyond the sheer conceptual diversity of the works on multiculturalism and 
the struggles for recognition of distinct identities, the focus of these writings does 
vary according to concrete cultural and historical experiences and to the political 
contexts in which such debates were born in recent years. The problematic of mul-
ticulturalism fundamentally changed according to such contexts, in ways that ex-
plain why there is no unified set of presuppositions or arguments that all theories 
of multiculturalism might share. For this reason, I intend to address here a rather 
much more narrow set of arguments put forward under the name of ”politics of 
difference” or ”identity politics” by such authors as Iris Marion Young, Seyla Ben-
habib1 and others. 
The differences entailed by identity represent more than just a rephrasing of 
the rather uncontroversial idea of value-pluralism. Value-pluralism denotes a 
broad and diverse set of theories and accounts which share, at least in a generic or 
minimal sense, an acknowledgement of the cultural diversity and plurality of in-
terests, values and forms of life in modern societies, and of the need to adequately 
take this fact in consideration within the normative construction of the political 
terms of our living together. In this quite uncontroversial version, it has character-
ized liberal and other theories, including republicanism or deliberative democracy. 
The accounts in question develop a different type of reasoning, however, by 
replacing value pluralism and the diversity of interests, with difference in identity; 
not only that identity, religion, culture, language, ethnicity crucially define the way 
in which we relate to the others: membership in identity-based social groups be-
comes itself the key focus of political theorizing. 
This paper is structured in two main parts: in the first part, the structure of 
politics of difference is discussed, by examining some main arguments developed 
by I.M. Young on the role of identity, oppression and justice. The wider intellectual 
                                                    
1 Seyla BENHABIB (ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the 
Political, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996. 
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context in which this debate takes place is briefly characterized. In the second part, 
I raise a number of issues which are related to the implications of this move from 
diversity of interests and conceptions, to difference of identity. I claim that a number of 
serious difficulties arise: such arguments are still dependent on problematic essen-
tialist and reductionist views of identity; culture or identity become the actors of 
political justification, instead of individuals; they tend to overlook the fact that re-
spect for diversity is not self-sustaining, hence the need for a definition of common 
conditions in which diversity is valued; such arguments have a hard time account-
ing for the internal diversity and legitimacy issues within those groups; finally, 
their attempt to provide a formal definition of cultural membership runs afoul of 
the contextually determined, historically relative experiences which have repre-
sented the origin of these debates. 
IDENTITY AND OPPRESSION IN IRIS MARION YOUNG’S 
”POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE” 
In Justice and the Politics of Difference1, I.M. Young mounts a long critique of 
both communitarian and liberal understandings of justice, and at the same time at-
tempts to elaborate a different perspective on the relevant and multiple forms of 
oppression that characterize contemporary plural societies. It is her claim that the 
liberal ideals of impartiality, equal rights or color-blind state have become more of 
an instrument for denying and ignoring relevant differences in favor of dominant 
attitudes and identities, and that denying differences represents in itself a form of 
oppression against the various minority social groups. The ”politics of difference”, 
then, represents an appeal for the need for group-differentiated policies and 
group-differentiated representations, as means to undo the structures and forms of 
oppression that the liberal theory apparently chooses to ignore. 
Young’s objective is to reformulate the ideal of social justice and the concept of 
oppression, so that the modern focus on a ”homogeneous” public will be displaced 
in favor of a perspective in which social groups and their specific and different 
identities, rather than individuals, become the subject of justificatory discourses. 
In that sense, Young criticizes what she calls the reductionism and the positiv-
ism of the dominant liberal political theory. The perceived reductionism of contem-
porary political theory is manifest, according to Young, in the constant fixation of 
liberal political theory to ”reduce political subjects to a unity and to value com-
monness or sameness over specificity and difference”2. The positivism of such ac-
counts is determined by ”too often assuming as given institutional structures that 
ought to be brought under normative evaluation”3. 
Misrepresentation or negation of the normative implications of identity differ-
ences represent defining trends that modern and contemporary liberal political 
                                                    
1 Iris Marion YOUNG, Justice and the Politics of Difference, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1990. 
2 Ibidem, p. 3. The main illustration of this denial of differences is perhaps the Rawlsian 
construction of an ”original position”, with its abstraction from the individual characteristics that 
differentiate persons in real life, in order to ensure fair conditions for the choice of the principles 
of justice. 
3 Ibidem. 
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theory assumes either overtly or implicitly, according to Young, and the reason for 
this incapacity to consider difference originates in a weak understanding of the norms 
of equality and the value of impartiality, as well as in the abandonment, by contem-
porary political theory, of the critical perspective on social and historical contexts. 
The drive towards de-contextualization is precisely what Young and other au-
thors would intend to reverse, in the name of a critical theory represented as a nor-
mative reflection that begins ”from historically specific circumstances, because 
there is nothing but what is, the given, the situated interest in justice, from which 
to start”1. One argument that shares affinities with communitarians’ critique of lib-
eralism is that liberal theorists’ claim to provide an elaboration of the elements of 
”a universal normative system insulated from a particular society” is at best illu-
sory, and fails to correctly represent the proper role of normative (critical) theory. 
”Without social theory, normative reflection is abstract, empty, and unable to 
guide criticism with a practical interest in emancipation”2. Moreover, the philoso-
pher must always perceive the distress of others’ (or his own) life – and his reflec-
tion on oppression will necessarily contribute to either reinforcing it or fighting it. 
The philosopher himself is socially situated, then, and hence he cannot abstract 
himself meaningfully or fruitfully from his own context. Choosing to deny or ig-
nore the forms of oppression present in his society will only reinforce these. The 
role of critical theory is thus to explore the ”normative possibilities unrealized but 
felt in a particular given society”3, in other words to elaborate norms and ideals 
that originate in the various modes of social organization that would be possible, 
preferable or desirable given the various experiences of oppression that the theo-
rist must uncover. 
Young’s theory is thus one that tries to reformulate the scope and aims of po-
litical theorizing about justice and social institutions. In order to expose the theo-
retical and practical shortcomings of dominant (liberal) political theory, inade-
quately focused on the ideal of impartiality and mechanisms of redistribution, 
I.M. Young elaborates a different conception of social justice, and at the same time 
develops a complex analysis of the notion of oppression and of the mechanisms to 
fight it, namely the ”politics of difference”. 
The main weakness of theories aiming for the ideal of impartiality and con-
structing mechanisms of redistribution in order to correct unfair inequalities is, ac-
cording to her, that these theories ignore the normatively significant differences and 
tend thus to confirm structural and latent forms of oppression, associated mainly, 
but not exclusively, with the attribution, by the dominant groups’ world views, of 
marginalizing roles and demeaning identities to the minority social groups. This in-
capacity of contemporary political theorizing to connect to some pertinent critical 
dimension represents the characteristic feature that Young attempts to correct, by 
providing the social theorist with the critical tools of evaluating experiences that are 
normatively relevant when focusing on institutional injustices. 
Young identifies the reasons for the growing disparity between ”contempo-
rary situated claims” about societies containing institutional injustices and the 
theoretical claims about justice, in some of the fundamental presuppositions of 
”modern western political philosophy” namely the ideal of impartiality and the 
                                                    
1 Ibidem, p. 5. 
2 Ibidem. 
3 Ibidem, p. 6. 
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associated mechanisms of correcting social injustice by redistributive mechanisms. 
The ideal of impartiality, according to her, ”denies difference”1. 
The reasons and implications of this important claim must be explained. The 
ideal of impartiality is typically assumed by, or associated with contemporary lib-
eral theories, and these are the focus of Young’s critique, but we may attempt to 
elaborate on one of Young’s remarks: ”The ideal of impartiality suggests that all 
moral situations should be treated according to the same rules”2. 
If I understand it correctly, the ideal of impartiality suggests rather that ”all 
moral situations, the differences among which are non-relevant, should be treated 
according to the same rules”. If that is the content of the ideal of impartiality, then 
this is of course a characteristic claim of most liberal theories, but it is also an aim 
present in most political, moral, and legal theories. The notion of judicial prece-
dent, for instance, and the dicton ”cases alike must be treated alike” in legal theory 
and judicial practice involves perhaps the same idea, namely that non-relevant dif-
ferences should not be taken into consideration and that adjudication must pro-
ceed relying on the evaluation of the relevant similarities as well as the relevant 
differences across cases or situations. What is debatable then is what qualifies as 
”cases alike” and not whether they should be treated alike. 
My contention is that eventually not the ideal of impartiality itself is conten-
tious in this sense, but rather the evaluation of the normatively ”significant” differ-
ences that should be taken into consideration and the differences among situations 
that should be discarded from the reasoning leading to adjudication or pol-
icy-making. In this sense, contesting or arguing about the ”relevant” differences 
does not necessarily amount to denying the notion of impartiality altogether. 
It may also be the case that I.M. Young provides a too vague description of the 
ideal of impartiality3. The idea that ”all moral situations must be treated according 
to the same rules” cannot easily be attributed to any coherent political or moral 
theory. Perhaps it means rather that ”all significantly similar moral situations must 
be treated according to the same rules”, and this would be again a rather general 
and little controversial ideal, leaving for theoretical and critical debate to establish 
the adequate ”relevant” similarities among moral situations. To recapitulate the 
analogy with jurisprudence, which ”cases” are ”alike” (which ”moral situations” 
display significant similarities) is the real subject of controversy, and much less the 
idea that they should be treated alike. 
The ideal of impartiality is also associated by Young, in a move similar to that 
of thinkers like Michael Sandel or Charles Taylor, to the idea of a single standpoint 
that ”all subjects can adopt”, an idea which ”denies the difference between sub-
jects”. ”By positing a unified and universal moral point of view, it generates a di-
chotomy between reason and feeling. Usually expressed in counterfactuals, the 
ideal of impartiality expresses an impossibility”4. 
This critique has a stronger implication, since it is related to the complex no-
tions of difference, identity and especially to the elaboration of the category of ”so-
cial groups”. Taylor’s ”politics of recognition” and Young’s ”politics of difference” 
                                                    
1 Ibidem, p. 10. 
2 Ibidem. 
3 For an elaborated account of the various understandings of impartiality as a criterion for 
justice and its possible alternatives see Brian BARRY, Justice as Impartiality, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1995. 
4 Iris Marion YOUNG, Justice and the Politics of Difference, cit., p. 10. 
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bear multiple similarities, including many aspects related to their foundations or 
presupposition, that is, a critique of the perceived theoretical shortcomings of the 
modern or contemporary view of the subject. Subjects of justice, in many liberal 
political theories, are invited to adopt a certain ”public” or ”common” standpoint, 
and that move entails denying or abandoning the differences that make the experi-
ences of each individual unique. Young contends that the moral ideal of impartial-
ity is often associated to a certain political ideal, the ideal of the ”civic public”. That 
political ideal is in fact the idea of homogeneous public that entails that many dif-
ferences are left aside as non-important. The ideal of impartiality is finally criti-
cized by I.M. Young in virtue of being a form of cultural imperialism, namely a 
kind of oppression, which tends to be less visible and at the same time more dan-
gerous than other forms of oppression. 
The defense of an alternative understanding of justice entails for Young em-
phasizing the overwhelming influence of social groups (and their status in the 
broader society) on the capacity of their members to realize the values that consti-
tute a good life, values of self-determination and self-development. It also entails 
deploying a complex analysis of what may impede on the individuals’ capacity to 
realize these values, and that means elaborating a typology of oppression that criti-
cizes the liberal – and even the Marxist understandings and classifications. 
Young’s claim is that "standard" elaborations of the concept of oppression 
missed some central aspects of that concept, and that could be explained by mod-
ern political theory’s concentration on finding the sources of oppression in the de-
liberate actions of identified or identifiable individuals or institutions, aiming to un-
justly or unjustifiably coerce individuals. Beyond deliberate oppression or domina-
tion however, there are, according to Young, many other fundamental aspects that 
are equally capable of diminishing or denying one’s capacities to realize the values 
of a good life. And these other aspects are even more damaging or destructive as 
they are less visible, non-intentional and hence it is more difficult to attribute them 
to, or originate them in the deliberate actions of specific individuals or institutions. 
These other forms of oppression are mainly structural, meaning that they are 
attached to a network of multiple and unrelated institutions, conducts, attitudes, 
informal relations and symbolic references, they most of the times concern specific 
(minority) social groups by attaching to the identity shared by the members of 
those groups devaluating social meanings, symbols or practices and they under-
mine by that the capacity of those individuals to form an adequate and positive 
valuation of their moral experiences, situations and traditions. 
Moreover, in order to undo the effects of oppression, some forms of group 
rights (among which there is a central political right of group representation) are to 
be devised and implemented. The ”politics of difference” aims then to realize the 
emancipation and liberation of social groups from their ascribed demeaning identi-
ties not by internally and publicly repudiating such identities, not by conforming 
to mainstream attitudes and practices, but on the contrary, by re-appreciating and 
re-constructing these identities as positive and worthy, as enabling – rather than 
shameful aspects. 
Of course, since in Young’s construction it is social groups that are represented as 
the primary focus of (structural) oppression, and individuals are considered as suf-
fering from oppression only by virtue of their belonging to these groups – as mem-
bers of those groups that receive a certain socially demeaning or degraded projection 
of their identity – it becomes of central importance for Young to provide an adequate 
definition of these ”social groups”. As we shall see, her intention is to offer such a 
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description of social groups that is both adequate for explaining the special forms of 
oppression associated with groups, and that enables her theory to avoid standard 
criticisms, especially the accusation of essentialism1. Social groups, according to 
Young, must not be assimilated to aggregates, nor to mere associations. 
Aggregates are constituted by ”any classification of persons according to 
some attribute”. This means that persons sharing a set of attributes, like eye color, 
the brand of their computers or the kind of music they listen to, can be classified 
into such groups without there being any obvious social or normative meanings 
associated with this casual membership. In this sense, it is not that attribute that is 
primarily meaningful and determines the existence of a social group: African 
Americans are not defined as a social group simply by their skin color; as Young 
notes, sometimes such an attribute is necessary, however it is not the attribute it-
self that marks a social group, but instead ”it is identification with a certain social 
status, the common history that social status produces, and self-identification that 
define group as a group”2. 
That also means that what is shared by the members of a social group is not 
simply the common (objective) attribute – sometimes the attribute is not even pre-
sent in some of its members, (as when the color of the skin is fairly light) – but a 
common identity. What actually defines their membership is this sense of a shared 
identity, a common fate, or a common understanding of their status as belonging 
to a same cultural or social situation. The meanings that constitute this identity 
may have been perhaps forced upon them or created by them, or a combination of 
both, but these meanings and identities are what differentiates their belonging to a 
social group from their belonging to an aggregate. 
People’s eye color or their skin color may seem to produce similar implica-
tions on their integration into the relevant categories or classifications if we regard 
aggregates as relevant, but the meanings associated with skin color are obviously 
much different if we take seriously the social significance and historical weight of 
some dimensions of the identification of skin as particularizing a group of people 
with or without their own acceptance of it. It is obvious that skin color, unlike eye 
color, has indeed played an overwhelming importance in the way entire groups of 
individuals, without any other connection among them, were treated, and also in 
the way they came to identify themselves, not always assimilating this feature with 
a positive or socially valued one. Skin color has been a ground for discrimination, 
oppression or fixation in rigid, unjust and undeserved social and political inferior 
positions. Individuals were oppressed because of their skin color, as a mark that 
applied to them as a group, and the same may be said about other marks such as 
gender, sexual preference etc. 
In Young’s view, that is a central feature of social groups, their members being 
marked as distinct from the rest by a certain feature, objective or not, and without 
there being a necessary connection between the mark itself and the treatment of the 
group in question. The social meaning attached to that feature is distinguishable 
from the trivial meanings attached to other features. 
                                                    
1 As her theory is intended as an alternative to both liberalism and communitarianism, 
Young has to provide an account of social groups that enables her to dissociate her view from 
both the aggregative/associative individualist views and the communitarian idealization of the 
communities. 
2 Iris Marion YOUNG, Justice and the Politics of Difference, cit., p. 43 
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The key element that differentiates a social group from an aggregate is the 
identity that comes to be shared by the members of the group, an identity either 
imposed upon them or developed by the members themselves, and this identity 
supplants the common feature (skin color, practice etc.) that initially defined mem-
bership. This key element enables Young to formulate a thesis that is similar to 
many communitarians’ claim, that is, that ”group meanings partially constitute 
people’s identities in terms of the cultural forms, social situation, and history that 
group members know as theirs, because these meanings have been either forced 
upon them or forged by them or both”. 
Social groups are equally distinct from associations. These are institutions that 
are formally organized and ruled, such as trade unions, clubs, political parties or 
even, according to Young, churches. The model of association is itself different from 
that of an aggregate in that it does acknowledge that the members do share com-
mon practices, values, beliefs or forms of common living. However, Young main-
tains that this model lacks a fundamental dimension necessary to tackle the com-
plex aspects of oppression suffered by individuals as members of certain groups: 
this model can only consider individuals as ”ontologically prior to the collective”1. 
This implies viewing individuals as setting up such associations in many 
fields of their social interactions on a voluntary basis, defining, controlling and 
modifying their constitutions as well as deciding when and why to leave such as-
sociations. It is of course a familiar structure of widespread social relations and in-
volves us on many levels of our social life. However, claims Young, this represents 
an incomplete perspective. Such a model, favored by the individualist contrac-
tarian approaches, is unfit to describe and build around phenomena of oppression 
associated with membership in a certain social group. What this model of associa-
tion misses is two-fold, and I.M. Young explains these two deficiencies in the fol-
lowing manner: first, adequately conceptualized social groups are not made up, 
constituted by individuals in a voluntary and deliberate manner. The individual is 
not, hence, prior to the collective, to the group itself, but rather finds himself in that 
social group. I will come back to this aspect below. The second claim put forward 
by Young, is that a person’s identity itself and sense of self are not prior or inde-
pendent of membership in the social groups. 
An association is indeed constituted by its members and it exists only as long as 
they see it fit. They institute it, define its rules, procedures, criteria of membership, 
structure and internal positions. Membership is usually voluntary and the individu-
als do come together ”as constituted persons”, in that their identities ”are usually re-
garded as prior to and relatively independent of association membership”. 
”A contract model of social relations”, according to Young, ”is appropriate for 
conceiving associations, but not groups”. Individuals constitute associations and 
enter these associations with already-structured identities. 
”Groups, on the other hand, constitute individuals. A person’s particular 
sense of history, affinity, and separateness, and even a person’s mode of rea-
soning, evaluating, and expressing feeling, are constituted partly by her or his 
group affinities. This does not mean that persons have no individual styles, or 
are unable to transcend or reject a group identity. Nor does it preclude persons 
from having many aspects that are independent of these group identities.”2 
                                                    
1 Ibidem. 
2 Ibidem, p. 44. 
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The problem emphasized by Young can be understood as follows: claims for 
recognition coming from members of oppressed social groups cannot be ade-
quately grasped if one places himself within the dominant paradigm in which so-
cial interactions are viewed as belonging to a ”privatized” sphere of voluntary as-
sociations. The control that individuals do possess upon associations, and their ca-
pacity to retain an identity somehow separated from these, is not matched by the 
influence of non-voluntary social group membership on their sense of self: 
”A person joins an association, and even if membership in it fundamen-
tally affects one’s life, one does not take that membership to define one’s very 
identity, in the way, for example, being [an Indian] Navaho might”1. 
The difference between an association and a social group is fundamental for 
Young in order to distinguish the specific forms of oppression that are associated 
with group membership but not to association membership. The fact that member-
ship in a social group influences a person’s identity in a manner that is incompara-
ble with voluntary association membership provides a ground for Young’s critique 
of a model widely accepted in (liberal) political theory but which does not, accord-
ing to her, render justice to the normative dimensions of the complex and less sali-
ent aspects of a person’s social status and position. Whether a person belongs or 
not to a social group that has traditionally been object of structural oppression is a 
fact without serious consequences in a contract model of association membership, 
whereas in the model proposed by Young, this fact becomes crucially relevant both 
for critical normative theory and for the effort to find institutional remedies to the 
situation of oppression. 
Non-deliberate and non-voluntary membership in social groups has quasi-po-
litical implications for Young: 
”Group affinity [...] has the character of what Martin Heidegger calls 
’thrownness’: one finds oneself as a member of a group, which one experi-
ences as always already having been. For our identities are defined in rela-
tion to how others identify us, and they do so in terms of groups which are 
always already associated with specific attributes stereotypes and norms”2. 
I mention this quasi-political dimension of group membership, besides the 
identification dimension, because this analysis of social group membership bears 
significant parallels to the strongest normative implications of the justification of 
political obligation in political theory. Without explicitly affirming this, I.M. Young 
”raises the normative stakes” of social group membership for political theory to 
the level of political membership in a political community. 
According to many conceptions in political philosophy, the most important po-
litical institutions and norms of a society have to be justified to those under their do-
minion precisely because of their non-voluntary and non-deliberate foundations. 
Social contract theory and other political theories, instead of considering political 
membership as voluntary, have placed such a considerable justificatory burden 
upon political discourse precisely because membership in a political order is not 
voluntary in the way membership in associations is. Constitutions and fundamental 
political institutions can and should be rationally justified to their subjects; social 
                                                    
1 Ibidem.  
2 Ibidem, p. 45. 
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contract, or rather hypothetical rational agreement, can be understood without 
there being the notion of a group of individuals actually deciding to set up an asso-
ciation that will rule their lives in the way they would set up a football association. 
The premise of political justification is that political membership is already 
given, individuals are born in already existing political societies, and what is 
needed is a theory explaining in which conditions their authoritative directives are 
justified. That is, in which conditions the authority is legitimate. The need for 
strong rational normative justification arises from this closed character of political 
communities. Their members have no meaningful exit option: we enter when born 
and exit by death. The existence of an exit option would entail that a person be able 
to re-create with others the basic terms of their political cooperation in a complete 
overhaul of these terms, or that he be able to leave one political community in or-
der to re-create another elsewhere; but one has nowhere else to leave because 
wherever he settles he will find himself subject to some political authority that he 
did not participate in establishing. 
This is what makes the case of political justification so compelling: fundamen-
tal political relations are different from associational voluntary relations precisely 
because, as John Rawls characterizes political relationship: 
”First, it is a relationship of persons within the basic structure of society, 
a structure of basic institutions we enter only by birth and exit only by death 
(or so we may appropriately assume). Political society is closed, as it were; 
and we do not, indeed cannot, enter or leave it voluntarily. 
Second, political power is, of course, always coercive power backed by a 
state’s machinery for enforcing its laws. But in a constitutional and democ-
ratic regime political power is also always traced to the power of equal citi-
zens as a collective body: it is regularly imposed on citizens as individuals, 
some of whom may not accept the reasons widely believed to justify the gen-
eral structure of political authority (the constitution); or when they do accept 
that structure, they may not regard as well grounded many of the laws en-
acted by the legislature to which they are subject”1. 
However, Rawls goes on in the following paragraph to make a contention that 
has been intensely criticized by Young: 
”There is a distinct domain of the political identified by these features 
(among others) to which certain values specified in an appropriate way, char-
acteristically apply. So understood, the political is distinct from the associa-
tional, say, which is voluntary in ways the political is not; it is also distinct 
from the familial and the personal, which are affectional, again in ways the 
political is not. (The associational, the familial, and the personal are simply 
three examples of the nonpolitical; there are others.)”. 
It is precisely this clear-cut distinction between the domains of the political 
and the non-political and their differential normative implications for political 
justification, that I.M. Young contest so strongly in her Justice and the Politics of 
Difference. The communitarian critique of the ”fictious” and ”un-situated” self at-
tempting to achieve an impartial standpoint void of particularisms, traditions and 
communal influences – associated with the feminist critique of the public/private 
                                                    
1 John RAWLS, Justice as Fairness. A Restatement, ed. by Erin Kelly, The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), London, 2001, p. 182.  
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liberal distinction that excludes ”the familial and the personal” from the proper do-
main of political justification, enable Young to formulate a critique that targets 
most of the standard assumptions of liberal political theory. 
Of course, the Rawlsian distinctions between public/nonpublic or the po-
litical/non-political do not completely overlap with the other classical liberal dis-
tinctions separating the public from the private, but it remains a strong assumption 
of many such theories that private attachments and personal commitments and af-
finities are not to be put on the same level as the fundamental political relation-
ship. Conciliating feminism and communitarianism is a rather difficult task, but 
Young deploys a combination of such arguments that are linked and harmonized 
in view of displacing a perceived dominant discourse in political theory that hap-
pens to be embraced mostly by liberal theorists. 
Young’s argument of the overwhelming importance of social group member-
ship as a matter of justice is comparable, as I mentioned above, to the liberals’ insis-
tence that a membership in a political community is the focus of political justifica-
tion. A methodologically individualist approach – which characterizes ”the social 
ontology underlying many contemporary theories of justice” – is not suited, in 
Young’s view, to render the ”thrownness” of group affinity. If the individual is pre-
sumed prior to the social, if the self is considered authentic if and only if autono-
mous, which for many critics of liberalism means ”self-made, standing apart from 
history and affiliations, choosing its life entirely for itself”1, then one is not able to 
adequately relate identification with oppression. Missing the complex way indi-
viduals’ identities are shaped by their group membership leads many (liberal) theo-
rists to find the reason for oppression in the group identification itself. Eliminating 
oppression then means eliminating groups. For Young, however, ”group differen-
tiation is both an inevitable and a desirable aspect of modern social processes”2. 
In order to understand this claim one has to remember Young’s first claim: 
namely, that traditional concerns with political and social rights are not to be con-
fused with the new concerns related to the recognition of individuals’ identity-re-
lated differences. 
What renders Young’s theory of social justice distinct from mainstream liberal 
egalitarianism and enables her to develop a strong critique thereof, is the original 
and at the same time controversial link between her definitions of social justice, op-
pression, difference and social groups, which in turn allow her to elaborate on the 
political consequences such as the ”politics of difference”. This means that in order 
to prove the existing (liberal or egalitarian) accounts of justice misguided or incom-
plete, she has to explain the way in which situations of lack of justice (that is, op-
pression) are not adequately answered by these accounts. 
In this sense, then, it is important to adequately understand the complex 
elaboration by Young of the situation of injustice determined by what she calls the 
absence of proper institutional support for the realization of self-development and 
self-determination. This implies for Young a discussion of the aspects of oppres-
sion and domination that emphasizes their multifaceted character. This, in turn, is 
then correlated with the fact that injustice originates mainly through inadequate 
treatment of group-specific differences. Oppression and domination, for Young, 
are much more complex phenomena than what has been understood thus far. 
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Liberal or Marxist elaborations of these notions have missed a central feature of 
oppression: the fact that it is not simply a matter of either illegitimate deliberate co-
ercion, or of class domination. It is rather a phenomenon that involves different, 
sometimes overlapping, non-intentional forms of obstruction on self-development, 
and it is a basic task for the political theorist to attempt to provide an account of 
oppression that covers its multiple forms. 
Oppression, for Young, is a more relevant concept for political theory. It some-
times includes or entails domination, but it is the multiple and many times elusive 
forms of oppression that render this concept both fundamental and difficult to grasp: 
”Oppression consists in systematic institutional processes which prevent 
some people from learning and using satisfying and expansive skills in so-
cially organized settings, or institutionalized processes which inhibit people’s 
ability to play and communicate with others or to express their feelings and 
perspective on social life in contexts where others can listen”. 
”Domination consists in institutional conditions which inhibit or pre-
vent people from participating in determining their actions or the conditions 
of their actions. Persons live within structures of domination if other persons 
or groups can determine without reciprocation the conditions of their actions, 
either directly or by virtue of the structural consequences of actions. Thor-
ough social and political democracy is the opposite of domination”1. 
Young is keen to emphasize the radical difference between her elaboration of 
the concept of oppression and most previous conceptualizations. It is her conten-
tion that we should not consider it as limited to conditions of material deprivation. 
This remark is manifestly directed against dominant (liberal) understandings, 
which presents the struggle for justice as a struggle for equal individual rights and 
equal access to the social, that is material and political, conditions for the fair value 
of these rights and liberties. 
The fact that oppression involves issues beyond material unfair inequalities 
and unfair distribution represents for Young a central claim used to extend the 
scope of the idea of oppression in order to cover many more aspects that equally 
impede the individual’s capacity for self-determination. Understanding oppression 
and thus injustice as entailing more, perhaps something radically different from, 
fair distribution, presupposes an elaboration of the concept that takes into consid-
eration both deliberate and non-deliberate, or ”structural”, forms of oppression, in 
other words requiring a mode of analyzing focused on the evaluation of social and 
institutional structures and practices that is ”incommensurate with the language of 
liberal individualism”. 
What differentiates then her analysis of oppression from previous accounts is 
the fact that hers corresponds to an account that proposes ”an enabling conception 
of justice”. That means in turn that questions of injustice are not simply related to 
issues of adequate or fair distribution of rights and opportunities, but more impor-
tantly, to the ”institutional conditions necessary for the development and exercise 
of individual capacities and collective communication and cooperation”2. 
This enabling conception of justice must include references that cannot be 
reduced to distributive patterns, since it is not only unfair distribution that charac-
terizes the conditions of injustice. These references relate to disabling constraints 
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on self-development and self-determination involved in procedures of deci-
sion-making, labor division, and culture, among others. 
Of course, the abstract definition of oppression is not sufficient for Young in 
order to provide a significant alternative conception of justice. Beyond the general 
understanding which equates oppression with some sort of inhibition or limitation 
of individuals’ capacities for formulating, expressing and pursuing their needs and 
feelings, there are some quite precise but mutually non-exclusive forms of oppres-
sion that together constitute the alternative understanding of the meaning of op-
pression and injustice which lays at the basis of Young’s construction. She charac-
terizes the analysis of this notion as revealing in fact ”a family of concepts and con-
ditions”, divided in five categories: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, 
cultural imperialism, and violence1. Among these complex forms of oppression, 
Young claims that it is cultural imperialism and marginalization that have been 
overlooked by most theories of justice, while violence or exploitation have already 
constituted the object of many discourses of justice. 
One central feature of this analysis is that this definition of oppression neces-
sarily has to include an adequate account of these five complex aspects or forms of 
oppression, and does not consider any one of these forms as having any sort of 
moral priority over the others. This means that not only are these not limited to the 
Marxist or liberal ”reductionist” accounts, but also, more importantly, that no one 
aspect can account for the ”true” or ”basic” form of oppression. Moreover, as indi-
viduals or members of groups, we may be the object of multiple forms of oppres-
sion and this situation may require differentiated remedies. 
It is important for Young to explain the limits of standard accounts of justice 
and oppression in order to make place for the alternative understanding that she 
promotes. As it has been mentioned, these limits are mainly related to the ”reduc-
tionist and simplistic” understanding of the actual conditions in which institutions, 
practices, and attitudes generate non-intentional constraints upon the individual’s 
capacities for realizing self-determination and self-development. Her own account 
of the five forms of oppression is intended as a more exhaustive and nuanced ac-
count of the situations in which such capacities are unjustly limited and develops 
in the same time a conception in which the systemic aspects of oppression are 
highlighted. In emphasizing these non-deliberate, structural aspects, Young draws, 
in an original way, upon various critical theories that include Marxism, communi-
tarianism, feminism and manages to extend these approaches towards an elabora-
tion of these forms of oppression that traces their causes and manifestation in prac-
tices and institutions that were not considered to be the proper object of study, that 
is, not having significant or relevant references for most theories of justice. 
These include everyday interactions among well-intentioned individuals, their 
assumptions and reactions illustrating cultural stereotypes, the mass media and its 
capacity to reproduce and propagate such often unconscious symbols and presup-
positions, institutional hierarchies and bureaucracies, and the market. The some-
times-elusive character of such forms of oppression must not obliterate the funda-
mentally damaging and lasting consequences upon the individuals that are object 
of such oppression. It is one thing to acknowledge the source of such forms of op-
pression as being ”embedded in unquestioned norms, habits and symbols, in the 
assumptions underlying institutional rules and the collective consequences of fol-
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lowing those rules”1, and another one to give up on trying to alleviate or eliminate 
such manifestations. 
Precisely because ”[o]ppression refers to systemic constraints on groups” and ”in 
this sense it is structural, rather than the result of a few people’s choices or policies”, 
that the critical theorist’s duty is to uncover and expose the complex manifestations 
and forms of oppression and suggest methods that adequately answer the plight of 
those who suffer because of these previously un-accounted for forms of oppression. 
It is indeed because such a complex account of ”structural” oppression may 
discourage approaching it within the standard requirements of analytical political 
theory, that Young employs such a lengthy analysis of this subject and of the corre-
lated notion of social group. She does claim that the reason for the modern political 
theory’s difficulty and ultimately, according to Young, incapacity to properly 
evaluate the causes and consequences of injustice as structural oppression, lies in 
the so-called misconstrued aim (the ideal of impartiality) and consequently in its 
preferred method (some sort of distribution and equality of opportunity). 
Liberal political theories, as well as other modern political theories, have con-
ceived as the fundamental proper subject of justice, the individual. The person, 
agent, actor has always been taken as not only the primary but the unique subject, 
and groups, minorities and communities in general were treated as merely associa-
tions of individuals, that is, their claims of justice were taken as amounting to not 
more than the sum of individual such claims. Individuals can be oppressed by 
states, tyrants, even communities, and their legitimate claims take precedence over 
any other collective aims. Traditionally, individual civil and political liberties rep-
resent protections against such entities and when associated with various forms of 
distribution these are meant to enable individuals to control and participate in 
those entities’ procedures of decision-making. Legitimate authority is authority 
that has a right to issue authoritative, compelling, and coercive directives, and that 
right is established through some sort of free agreement, acquiescence or participa-
tion from individuals as equals. 
In recent liberal theorizing, various aims related to perfectionist, paternalist poli-
cies or social utility can only be accepted, if then, after adequate respect and protec-
tion of individual legitimate basic interests, and these protections are always against 
salient, visible, deliberate such policies or actions by specific entities such as individu-
als, collectivities, institutions or the state. This explains the unease, which is manifest 
in these theories, to take into consideration any forms of injustice that do not corre-
spond and cannot be corrected according to the aims and methods specified above. 
According to Young, the structural character of oppression render inadequate 
former approaches of based on distribution and equality of opportunity. It is insuf-
ficient to devise some new rules or laws in order to eliminate such forms of oppres-
sion for the reason that these tend to reproduce themselves, which means that such 
mechanisms cannot fundamentally affect and change the omnipresent and perva-
sive cultural, political, social, and economic institutions that confirm and propa-
gate structural oppression. 
Which are then these forms of systemic or structural oppression? One form 
that has been, indeed, only marginally treated in political theory, and then mainly 
in feminist writings, is cultural imperialism. It has been marginally treated for the 
simple reason that it is almost a matter of perception, or rather non-perception. On 
                                                    
1 Ibidem, p. 41. 
408 CAMIL ALEXANDRU PÂRVU 
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. VII • no. 2 • 2007 
the one hand, its supposed effect on individuals is to inoculate meanings and inter-
pretations of a dominant group, replacing their original understandings and 
self-understandings. On the other hand, I will argue that one major difficulty with 
Young’s claim is that one has no independent criterion to establish whether forms 
of cultural imperialism have ceased. 
What Young understands by cultural imperialism is the phenomenon by 
which a member of one social group experiences ”how the dominant meanings of 
a society render the particular perspective of one’s own group invisible at the same 
time as they stereotype one’s group and mark it as the Other”1. In a similar move 
with many critical feminists, Young argues that modern and contemporary politi-
cal theorizing ignores the complex and often subtle ways in which dominant 
groups impose their experiences and cultural forms upon the other groups, trans-
forming these dominant understandings into ”the norm”, and thereby not only de-
nying other groups the capacity to form and express their own (self-) understand-
ings, but also contributing to their marginalization, fixation in pejorative, negative 
or repressed identities. 
Again, this process and its consequences do not have to be intended, deliber-
ate, and indeed, it is precisely when it is not deliberate that it becomes more diffi-
cult to contemplate and correct. What is interesting in Young’s analysis is the per-
ception that the non-deliberate character of cultural imperialism takes the forms of 
apparently ”neutral” positions. Neutrality, as impartiality, is a dangerous ideal 
precisely because impossible. It only hides and renders difficult to observe the fact 
of cultural imperialism. Groups that experience cultural imperialism are rendered 
invisible and at the same time marked as the Other, but the cultural imperialists 
themselves need not be aware of their non-neutral attitudes, indeed not aware that 
they form a group, a dominant group. 
”Judgments of beauty or ugliness, attraction or aversion, cleverness or 
stupidity, competence or ineptness, and so on are made unconsciously in in-
teractive contexts and in generalized media culture, and these judgments of-
ten mark, stereotype, devalue, or degrade some groups.”2 
Cultural imperialism, marginalization, powerlessness are forms of structural, 
non-intentional oppression that need not be associated with overt discrimination 
or downright violence. The fundamental aspect underlying this strange relation, 
for Young, is that 
”The systemic character of oppression implies that an oppressed group 
need not have a correlate oppressing group. While structural oppression in-
volves relations among groups, those relations do not always fit the para-
digm of conscious and intentional oppression of one group by another”3. 
There is, however, always a (sometimes unaware) privileged group for any 
oppressed one. Moreover, when oppression takes these less visible forms, the im-
age of neutrality and impartiality serves to mask deep and devaluating prejudices, 
and the social groups thus oppressed are in a twofold difficulty. Cultural imperi-
alism, according to Young, is associated with false neutrality, and that renders 
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oppressed groups not only humiliated by the condescending, aversive behavior of 
others, but also silent, forced to experience such treatment while unable to confront 
the others about the perceptions that inform the oppressive attitudes. 
If I understand Young correctly, that implies that the neutralist or impartialist 
standards in moral and political reasoning and discourse not only mask prejudice 
against particularities, but also incapacitate members of oppressed groups to react 
against such prejudice and force these to perpetuate and confirm the prejudices. 
This may be explained perhaps also by a lesser capacity of oppressed groups to 
translate their claims into the neutralist discourse that serves to propagate oppres-
sion itself. Remember Young’s critique of the ideal of impartiality: 
”The ideal of impartial transcendental subject denies or represses differ-
ence in three ways. First, it denies the particularity of situations. Second, in 
its requirements of dispassion, impartiality seeks to master or eliminate het-
erogeneity in the form of feeling. Third, the most important way that ideal of 
impartiality reduces particularity to unity is in reducing the plurality of 
moral subjects to one subjectivity. In its requirement of universality, the ideal 
of impartial reason is supposed to represent a point of view that any and all 
rational subjects can adopt, precisely by abstracting from situational particu-
larities that individualize them.”1 
Or, it is – according to Young –, precisely by the forced ignorance of the ”situ-
ational particularities” that the ideal of impartiality undermines the quest of authen-
ticity and thus the capacity of oppressed groups to resist or fight prejudice. If the 
goal is a ”transformative politics that aims to undermine oppression and domina-
tion”, then one must take seriously the contexts in which these occur, whatever their 
complexity. That means for Young acknowledging the difficulty of the task of ”locat-
ing the conceptual and normative problems that bedevil our political conflicts” and 
the ”perpetual failures to redress injustice”. ”Liberal individual institutions”, she 
claims, are not sufficiently adapted ”to overcome the very real dilemma that to do 
justice we must attend to liabilities generated by social group differentiation, but we 
must also attend to the relational fluidity and internal differentiation of groups”2. 
This is indeed the ambitious aim that may single out the effort of Young from 
both liberal individualism and communitarianism: Providing an account of struc-
tural and systemic, not only manifest, deliberate oppression – which places 
group-differentiation as one of the defining trigger-causes of such oppression and 
justifies group-differentiated rights of representation – and at the same time, em-
phasizes mediation and fluidity instead of rigid fixating or reifying group attrib-
utes. Ultimately, I contend that this strategy fails, for the reasons developed in the 
second part of this article. 
The conception of groups is central in Young’s theory: 
”A social group is a collective of persons differentiated from at least one 
other group by cultural forms, practices or ways of life. Members of a group 
have a specific affinity with one another because of their similar experience 
or way of life, which prompts them to associate with one another more than 
with those not identified with the group, or in a different way. Groups are ex-
pressions of social relations; a group exists only in relation to at least one 
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 Iris Marion YOUNG, ”A Reply to Trebble”, Political Theory, vol. 30, no. 2, April 2002, 
pp. 286-287. 
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other group. Group identification arises, that is, in the encounter and interac-
tion between social collectivities that experience some differences in their 
way of life and forms of association, even if they also regard themselves as 
belonging to the same society”1. 
Nevertheless, despite Young’s efforts of demarcation, the main tension of this 
theoretical construction derives from her insistence that social groups be the sub-
jects of discourses of justice and the central aim of the politics of difference, while 
at the same time defining the object of social justice (reducing oppression and 
domination) in rather individualist terms. 
After all, even in Young’s alternative account of social justice, it is individuals’ 
capacities for self-determination and self-definition that justice is meant to protect. 
This tension is actually capable of undermining her explicit effort to present her 
theory as different from both liberal individualism and communitarianism. By re-
fusing the idealization of communities, offering a description of a fluid and over-
lapping membership in social groups, Young has to address the possibility that op-
pression occurs not only among groups, but also, crucially, within groups. The de-
fense of group rights and the defense of individual rights can many times be in-
compatible and Young does not seem to provide a clear method of adjudicating be-
tween competing claims. 
Young’s critique of the ideal of impartiality actually expressly shares many 
features with both Michael Sandel’s critique of John Rawls’ theory as well as femi-
nism’s critique of liberalism. Her argument 
”against the effort to construct an impartial point of view is not simply that is 
it abstract, unencumbered, as Sandel ably shows. More important, I argue, 
drawing on theorists of class, gender and racial hegemony, that the assertion 
of an impartial standpoint under circumstances of differential power results 
in distortion or silencing of members of the polity who are not members of 
the hegemonic group”2. 
This double perspective in Young’s work provides an interesting tool for ap-
proaching the main theories of justice and avoiding the standard responses to com-
munitarian or feminist critiques. 
However, at least one important question mark is raised by Young’s insistence 
that oppressed social groups should be entitled to special rights of representation. To 
generalize the problem, the question is, why should historical oppression give social 
groups some sort of permanent rights beyond the (however durable) always tempo-
rary rights for compensation of their individual members? After all, liberal policies 
already include a long set of principles of compensations, redistribution etc, which 
are intended precisely to provide the members of such historically oppressed groups 
with the means for not being unfairly disadvantaged in their choices. 
The challenge that Young mounts against liberal theories is radical, in this 
sense, since it does not merely purports to re-arrange the already present or desir-
able policies for that aim. Instead, the ”politics of difference” introduces the pre-
scription of group rights of representation, and while she firmly denies any incom-
patibility with individual rights, one cannot exclude the conflicts that such an 
approach may allow. 
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Questions as ”who is the narrator of the group’s history of oppression?”, or 
”who decides which aspects of the fluid identities need to be protected?” are not 
simply to be answered by designating either ”the group” or ”the majority in the 
larger society”. Of course, within groups themselves historical oppression may 
also exist. In that case, we may end up in a cycle of dilemmas in which protecting 
some identities necessarily means reinforcing intra-group oppressions and, unfor-
tunately, there may be no accurate way to exit such dilemmas. 
The problem may be one of good intentions and bad policies, but in fact, as I 
will argue in the next section, there are certain structural dilemmas of the dis-
courses aiming to protect groups or cultures that inevitably brings them into colli-
sion with classical liberal concerns for the primacy of the individual, and, inevita-
bly, with the basic tenets of the contemporary justificatory project. To quote Mar-
tha Nussbaum, one may, in the end, wonder which is the normative appeal of such 
protection, after all; referring to more radical discourses for the protection of mi-
nority cultural practices and their potential conflict with the main protections of in-
dividual liberties, Nussbaum draws this conclusion: ”It is hard to understand how 
the sad history of a group can provide a philosophical justification for the gross de-
nial of individual rights and liberties for the members of the group”1. 
WHOSE IDENTITY, WHICH TOLERATION? 
I advance, in this final section, a number of considerations pertaining to the 
problematic nature of the arguments for identity policies and the ”politics of differ-
ence”. There are several aspects, in my view, that may indeed pose significant diffi-
culties in the way toward an elaboration of a conception of group-differentiated 
cultural rights, aspects that are insufficiently taken into consideration by authors 
such as Seyla Benhabib2, Charles Taylor3, Iris Marion Young, or Will Kymlicka4. 
I concentrate my analysis around the following three points: first, we may 
question the internal incoherence or indeterminacy of theories that prescribe 
group-differentiated policies while defining groups in a rather indeterminate fash-
ion. I call this the problem of structural over-inclusiveness and I treat it as applying to 
the arguments for instituting group-differentiated policies such as special repre-
sentation rights for ambiguously defined oppressed social groups, or exemptions 
from generally applicable laws. 
Secondly, I follow Brian Barry and others in questioning the possible hidden 
logic of cultural essentialism in these writings, a charge that is though vigorously (but, 
I contend, unsuccessfully) denied by many theorists of multiculturalism. This cri-
tique applies to the internal logic and practical consequences of instituting cultural 
group-differentiated policies, and is best captured by Susan Moller Okin’s question-
ing of the compatibility between multicultural policies and gender equality. 
Thirdly, I question the lack of symmetry of the burdens of justification, 
among the levels of political justification and intra-group justification. This final 
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critique refers to the puzzle of justificatory asymmetry; it reveals the difficulty of 
conceiving a differential burden of justification, and has a clear implication on the 
(in)compatibility of identity group-differentiated rights and the individual rights 
to political justification. 
Structural Over-inclusiveness 
What is perhaps overlooked in many occurrences of the debates on the desir-
ability of multicultural policies advocating the public recognition of distinct and 
valuable identities is that many theories of multicultural toleration seem to have 
failed to account for the full variety of potential social groups, cultural identities, or 
cultural practices that may press claims for toleration. By simply praising the exis-
tence of a visible plurality of forms of cultural experience, many theorists seem to 
ignore the fact that there is also a significant variety of the claims for toleration, and 
that it is not clear why all these claims should be compatible or equally valuable. 
A community with a historical experience of racial discrimination and margin-
alization obviously may advance claims for a different type of toleration than, for 
example, a radical environmentalist or a religious group. The reasons for these 
claims for recognition are completely different, and a theory that praises ”cultural 
survival” or ”difference” as such may fail to capture and render justice to the real 
differences in the reasons and justification of the various claims. 
At the same time, it seems that many theories of multiculturalism focus on 
some ideal of cultural community, which is somehow threatened to disappear in 
the context of modernity, criticism, and social mobility. In reality, however, there 
are very few entities resembling such ”pure” communities, if they exist at all, and 
while trying to preserve this ideal projected upon some existing cultural communi-
ties in the name of ”difference”, one has to acknowledge that many other similar 
claims, whether reasonable or not, should be publicly endorsed too. 
That may explain why discussions about the proper limits of (liberal or democ-
ratic) tolerance are so difficult to settle. One of the difficulties with the ”identity poli-
tics” or the ”politics of difference” is that they may at times plausibly identify reason-
able claims for remedy from specific historically discriminated and oppressed com-
munities, but at the same time, they do lend legitimacy to many other claims that 
have unrelated origins. An adequately developed theory of toleration must provide 
for criteria and forms of toleration that are neither under-inclusive nor over-inclusive. 
While the multiculturalist critique addressed to liberal justifications of political 
toleration is that the liberal construction of the criteria and forms of toleration is un-
der-inclusive, and that it does not account for a multitude of relevant differential cul-
tural or social experiences – be they of oppressed minorities or fragile cultures –, the 
reverse critique of over-inclusivity may be addressed to some of the theories enthu-
siastically praising ”difference”. Not all differences and not all claims for toleration 
can be equally justified. 
An adequate theory of toleration, according to Sheldon Leader, must corre-
spond to a number of criteria, among which ”that it will cover a sufficient range of 
real issues, and […] that it will not be biased”1. 
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If we focus on the first of these criteria, it entails that such a theory must be ca-
pable of accounting for a relevant number of situations that ”come under the ge-
neric topic of toleration”, while developing a limited set of formal and substantive 
tests and principles. A theory of toleration that focuses narrowly on the demands 
of a certain social group, or on the contrary, extends the public recognition of such 
claims indiscriminately to any manifestation of ”difference” – is an inadequate the-
ory, either biased or under/over-inclusive or both. 
Moreover, a theory may be under-, or over-inclusive in two distinct ways. It 
may be so either in respect to the specification of real situations that should prop-
erly fall under its scope and be legitimately accounted for, that is, its tests and cri-
teria may refer to a too limited or to a too indiscriminate set among the possible 
and legitimate situations of tolerance; or it may be so in relation to its internal 
structure, that is, this inadequacy may be built into the very premises of the justifi-
cation for toleration. 
Let me explain this distinction. A theory of toleration, for example, must pro-
vide, on the one hand, a set of principles that offer guidance as to how to answer 
specific claims for toleration, and on the other hand, a set of criteria, that offer 
guidance as to which situations properly fall under the scope of those principles. 
Now, it is one thing to say that a certain theory’s criteria miss certain situa-
tions of toleration or perhaps include claims for toleration that should not properly 
be awarded recognition (I will call this contextual under- or over-inclusiveness), 
and it is another thing to say that the reasons for toleration themselves, apart from 
the criteria for judging to which claims these principles apply, are inadequately 
formulated (structural under- or over-inclusiveness). 
If, let’s say, the reason for toleration is that all cultures or cultural forms are 
equally valuable and must be equally protected, or if that reason is cultural sur-
vival per se, then the indeterminacy and over-inclusivity is built into the very prem-
ises of the argument for toleration. If, on the other hand, the reasons for toleration 
are drawn from a larger and coherent theory that includes also an indication of the 
limits of such toleration, limits that are necessary in order not to witness performa-
tive contradictions, then the charge of over- or under-inclusiveness may refer 
rather to the particular, modifiable criteria that establish which claims are properly 
covered by these principles, and not to the principles themselves. 
It follows that an adequate theory of toleration must, on the one hand, provide 
an argument for toleration that is cogent and thoroughly coherent, that explains 
the reasons for and the limits of toleration in a principled and precise way, and on 
the other hand provides specific criteria that enable us to distinguish properly 
among the possible situations that should be covered by its principles. At both lev-
els such a theory should avoid over- or under-inclusiveness. 
It may not be reasonable to expect from any political theory of toleration to 
provide a full set of justifications for its principles as well as a complete set of crite-
ria for all possible situations that should fall under its scope of application. How-
ever, it is reasonable to demand from such a theory that it preserves a certain co-
herence among justifications, principles of toleration and the criteria of application. 
Theories of toleration are indeed, after all, theories of public justification. 
I.M. Young’s theory represents perhaps such an example of structural over-inclu-
siveness in the formulation of the reasons for, and of the principles of toleration. 
The manifest but widely overlooked over-inclusiveness derives from the defini-
tions that the author provides for the relevant social groups that deserve to be pro-
tected under the ”politics of difference”. Her characterization of these groups and 
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the reasons for their special representation is, in this sense, more problematic than 
the formulation of the criteria for assessing which situations properly fall under 
the application of her principles. 
The theory is thus over-inclusive not as much because of these criteria, but 
rather because Young offers at the first level, a too vague notion of what consti-
tutes a social group and why it needs special policies of representation. The notion 
of a social group is central in Young’s account, and it is incorporated into the main 
argument for the ”politics of difference”. It explains the reasons for such a policy, 
since structural oppression occurs at the level of the social group. Consequently, 
the notion of a social group is not one that is used only to highlight marginal exam-
ples or possible applications. 
Throughout her book, the only references, when it comes to examples of op-
pressed social groups and the comparison of the remedies provided by (according 
to her, inadequate) liberal institutions and alternatively by the institutions apply-
ing a ”politics of difference”, are chosen among the various social groups involved 
in the civil rights movements, and especially groups based on gender, race, age or 
physical disabilities. Comparing these restrictive criteria with her own – rather 
generous – definition of a social group, generates a number of obvious interroga-
tions, which are unfortunately not answered. 
On the one hand, Iris Young’s definition of a social group is regrettably vague 
and indeterminate, since it relies on differential cultural forms: ”A social group is a 
collective of persons differentiated from at least one other group by cultural forms, 
practices, or ways of life”1. On the other hand, by distinguishing the social group 
from aggregates or associations, and instituting shared identities and cultural 
forms as the defining elements of social groups, Iris Young does indeed provide a 
powerful account of the complexity of social experiences and relationships. She 
also provides a compelling argument for taking into consideration structural op-
pression, its reasons and its consequences on the ability of members of such op-
pressed social groups to meaningfully act as equal citizens. However, it is difficult 
to associate group-differentiated rights to social groups thus (broadly) defined. 
Moreover, while Young restricts the ”eligible” social groups with criteria related to 
gender, race or sexual orientation, this restriction is in no way demanded by her 
definition of what a social group is, or how structural oppression works. 
The impression left when reading these examples is that Young never stops to 
consider whether other social groups, given the generous and all-encompassing 
definition thereof she provides, might be equally entitled to file for such special 
protections. It does seem intuitively obvious that certain groups’ claims to tolera-
tion may be at odds with her own idea of what should be protected; but, as it is ap-
parent also in the case of the possible hidden logic of cultural essentialism, it seems 
again that the theory, as it is formulated, cannot but include and legitimize claims 
that perhaps contradict the initial intentions and moral outlook of the author. 
Will Kymlicka introduces in Multicultural Citizenship2 a number of distinctions 
among forms of cultural pluralism, among group-differentiated rights and among 
reasonable protections for such groups. These distinctions are necessary, in his 
view, in order to clarify the precise contours of the conflict between liberal individ-
ual rights and collective rights, more precisely, to accommodate the protection of 
                                                    
1 Iris Marion YOUNG, Justice and the Politics of Difference, cit.p. 43, emphasis added. 
2 Will KYMLICKA, Multicultural Citizenship. A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1996.  
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the cultural contexts of autonomous choice with the traditional liberal concerns for 
individual rights. 
The first distinction is between multinationalism and polyethnicity, where the 
former describes territories on which, over time, more than one people or nation 
exists; the latter refers to the presence of newly immigrated communities. The sec-
ond distinction separates self-government rights, polyethnic rights1 and special 
representation rights. While the first two kinds of rights are usually the focus of the 
new literature on multiculturalism, the special representation rights are assimi-
lated to the already standard liberal defense of temporary measures of compensa-
tion and protection for historically oppressed groups, such as, for instance, af-
firmative action policies in education and political representation. 
Kymlicka’s argument throughout the book is that collective rights and individ-
ual rights must not necessarily come into conflict or be incompatible. By focusing on 
the terminology of group-differentiated rights instead of ”collective” rights, Kym-
licka argues that we should view the problematic of group-differentiated rights in 
terms of external protections to groups (protections of group-specific cultural experi-
ences against the dissolution in the wider society) and internal restrictions (restric-
tions imposed on individuals members of such groups). While external protections 
may be warranted for providing compensatory (yet – importantly – not temporary, 
as in the case of the liberal defense of affirmative action) measures for minorities 
that are vulnerable in the face of the larger society, and as such do not necessarily 
come into conflict with individual rights, the internal restrictions – intended or 
claimed as limitations of members’ individual rights in order to promote or protect 
some collective aim – are, from the liberal perspective, truly problematic2. 
These distinctions, while providing a very useful categorization of the different 
contexts of the claims of minorities, and at the same time treating as a matter of jus-
tice the differential responses that the liberal state must provide to these minorities, 
have inevitably a too rigid character. In the words of I.M. Young, the distinction it-
self between national minorities and ethnic minorities, while a first step towards 
contextualizing the demands of justice for these groups, has a too categorical na-
ture. It is impossible to distinguish with such confidence, according to Young, ”mu-
tually exclusive categories of cultural minorities”3. Instead, she suggests that: 
”It is far better to think of cultural minorities in a continuum, or perhaps 
in a set of continua […] Thinking of differences among cultural groups as a 
matter of degree rather than kind, […] seems to me to fit the facts better and 
to support more nuanced moral arguments”4. 
However, the basic problem in this context is, in my view, that while Kym-
licka’s categorical distinction, and the differential prescriptions of justice he associ-
ates to it, renders his conceptual apparatus under-inclusive – by missing a host of 
situations (i.e., cultural minorities) that do not fit in either of his categories, and at 
                                                    
1 Joseph Carens estimates that the difference between the first two kinds of rights lies in that 
”polyethnic rights do not necessarily require any control by the group over the legislative or 
administrative process establishing or carrying out the rights”; Joseph CARENS, ”Liberalism and 
Culture”, Constellations, vol. 4, no. 1, 1997, p. 37. 
2 Will KYMLICKA, Multicultural Citizenship...cit., pp. 34-48. 
3 Iris Marion YOUNG, ”A Multicultural Continuum: A Critique of Will Kymlicka’s 
Ethnic-Nation Dichotomy”, Constellations, vol. 4, no. 1, 1997, p. 50. 
4 Ibidem, pp. 50-51. 
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the same time seriously but groundlessly over-emphasizing the difference between 
national and ethnic minorities –, Young’s own version is symmetrically over-inclu-
sive, for the reasons suggested above. 
The origin of this conundrum consists in fact in the considerable difficulty of 
conceiving ”groups” as rights-bearers, in a strong sense; that is, in the sense of 
groups holding rights to political justification, since that implies searching for the 
fundamental yet ever-elusive characteristics that entitle such groups to acquire the 
formal status of actors or subjects of political justification. The next lines are dedi-
cated to the critique of this search, and the further complications it generates. 
Cultural Essentialism 
It is interesting to view some of the most powerful critiques that, for instance, 
Brian Barry1 among others, addresses against some of the authors best known for 
their insistence upon some forms of multiculturalism or politics of difference, as 
targeting in fact the internal incoherences of such theories. Barry argues, for exam-
ple, that there is a common problematic assumption in the arguments of I.M. Young 
or James Tully2, namely that of essentialism. 
Of course, Tully, Young and Kymlicka3 explicitly and repeatedly deny that any 
such assumption exists in their arguments; they, moreover, criticize in turn alternative 
or competing theories as failing precisely to reject and eliminate this presupposition. 
We can surely read Barry’s critique as representing more than an all-out, prin-
cipled opposition to the inclusion of diversity and cultural forms from liberal po-
litical justification. In his book, he devotes a great length of argumentation in favor 
of accommodating liberal principles to contemporary pluralism and multicultural-
ism, understood as a social characteristic of liberal societies. He convincingly de-
ploys a number of liberal positions intended to cover the relevant aspects of social 
exclusion and injustice, and despite the polemic tone of his work, he is committed 
to answer the fundamental concerns of his opponents. 
Instead, he makes the distinction between multi-culturality and multicultural-
ism, in other words between the fact of multiculturalism and the policies usually 
advocated under this name. While praising diversity and multi-culturality and ad-
vocating for the inclusion of plural experiences and identities into the main liberal 
justificatory project, he explicitly rejects any capacity to principled and non-tempo-
rary multicultural policies, as advocated by Young, Kymlicka or Taylor, to effec-
tively ensure the value of equal citizenship and meaningfully equal political rights. 
In this sense, Barry’s commitment to liberal equality prevents him from ac-
cepting multicultural policies other than with temporary effects. Contemporary 
liberalism’s advocacy in favor of affirmative action or positive discrimination is 
meant to reduce, as temporary policies, the effects of historical discrimination and 
oppression, and equalize through temporary compensations the conditions for the 
                                                    
1
 Brian BARRY, Culture and Equality, Polity Press, Cambridge (UK), 2001, and IDEM, 
”Essentialism and Multiculturalism, A Response”, Ethnicities, vol. 2. no. 2, June 2002, pp. 284-288. 
2 James TULLY, Strange Multiplicity. Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, New York, 1995. 
3 Will KYMLICKA, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p. 44.  
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equality of opportunity or equality of chances. Multicultural policies, instead, are 
supposed to render permanent a special status for particular cultural or ethnic 
groups by virtue of these groups’ cultural specificity, and not by virtue of their 
members’ equal status as free citizens. 
Building on such an argument, it becomes clear that multicultural policies risk 
fixing members of given groups within a particular reading of their own identity, 
certainly perpetuating by neglect the contradictions and tensions within those 
groups. In addition, that particular and always temporary reading of the group’s 
identity – which would thus be recognized and sanctioned by the state – is by no 
means the only possible reading. It might just as well represent a certain given 
power structure within the group, a synthesis of historical injustices and exclusions 
characterizing not just the relation between the group and the rest of the society, 
but the relations within the group itself. And thus, the problem cannot be solved 
by simply granting state recognition to some particular definition of the group’s 
identity. Who is entitled to provide that definition? Which are the normal guaran-
tees that have to accompany that process of (self-) definition, such that mis-recog-
nition does not simply shifts places? 
Because, if Charles Taylor legitimately warns us against the consequences of 
society’s misrecognition of particular identities, then there is a particularly sensi-
tive case to be made regarding the risk that the misrecognition within groups be-
comes sanctioned by such group-differentiated rights. The problem of misrecogni-
tion is not solved by simply shifting its possible location. If the language of rights is 
deployed – and not just employing these terms as a figure of speech –, it is funda-
mentally necessary to identify what defining features would allow for the identifica-
tion of the right-bearer, and hence the problem of the definition of those essential 
features becomes central and inescapable. The process of providing an explicit and 
definitive identification of the essential features – which in turn allow the identifi-
cation of a group as rights-bearer – is deeply problematic, not only because of the 
essentialist approach implied, but also because of the fact that there are no inde-
pendent ways to verify whether the definition itself does not rely upon, or conse-
crates, historic forms of misrecognition and oppression. 
The definition of the essential features of a group deserving rights can only 
come from two directions. On the one hand, it can be the majority, or the state, or 
some administrative agencies which are entrusted with, and have the authoriza-
tion to proceed with such characterizations. On the other hand, it may be some 
process of self-identification that results in the public affirmation of the defining fea-
tures to be protected, and of the associate claims for group-differentiated rights. 
Administrative decisions in such sensitive issues are, of course, profoundly unreli-
able and leave much space for prejudice and misrepresentation But the alternative 
process of self-identification is also problematic. It is always a complex course and 
one that should raise serious concerns. 
The origin and the actors of the process of self-identification, as well as the 
content of the group’s characteristics that have to be protected, constitute a delicate 
problem. In certain situations, self-identification processes generate a race among 
potential actors in search for more radical and exclusive definitions and affirma-
tions of the group’s essential attributes, and struggles for sharper identification. 
While the normal history of such groups makes possible the gradual confrontation 
and even critical examination of their central cultural, religious attributes, prac-
tices, values, the problematics of rights based on such attributes generates, un-
avoidably, a fixation and a reduction of that complex evolution, an essentialization 
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or re-essentialization. That might be the basis for Barry’s concern. If the language 
of rights is employed, that fact by itself is inevitably associated with an effort of 
identification and formalization of such debatable and inexorably fluid attributes 
of various groups, paradoxically generating a need for the fixation of otherwise 
changing identities. 
Cultural essentialism, according to Barry, is closely related to a ”birth is fate” 
presupposition, to the idea that group differences are acquired at birth, and refers 
to the deeply problematic idea 
”that members of such groups have some sort of primordial attachment to 
certain ways of life or ways of looking at the world, and can flourish only if 
these are sustained, if necessary over the objections of some of those who are 
members of the group by birth”1. 
The assumption of cultural essentialism, while vigorously denied by Tully, 
Young and others, must actually be present in their theories, according to Barry, in 
order to make sense of several of their arguments and examples. Without such a 
presupposition, it would be difficult to understand why cultural differences per se 
would play such an important role in the prescription of multicultural policies, and 
why is it necessary to protect cultural forms, whatever their nature, even against 
the options of the members of those groups that are attached to, or define them-
selves by reference to these differences. 
An account of toleration based on the ideal multiculturalism, which does 
indeed presuppose cultural essentialism, is manifold problematic. In the case of 
I.M. Young, while she emphatically denies2 any fixed identities for the members 
of the social groups that deserve special representation rights, emphasizing the 
fluidity of identities and the permeability of groups’ borders, one cannot make 
sense of her demands for special group-differentiated rights without assuming 
some sort of cultural essentialism. Despite the distinction she operates between 
”difference” and ”identity”, these rights seem less intended to compensate for his-
torical oppression, as rather to validate and endorse the given definition of cultural 
forms and ways of life within groups, whatever the origin of such definitions. 
As Adam Trebble remarks, despite Young’s insistence on offering an anti-es-
sentialist justification of such rights: 
 ”No account is offered to explain why social group-differentiated domi-
nation and oppression is normatively significant – and thus meriting institu-
tional attention in the form of specific representation – whilst the oppression 
of a subgroup from within a social group is not. Yet, it seems that subgroups 
are just as important as social groups as objects of domination and oppres-
sion because membership of more than one social group may be the trigger 
of oppressive relations for the same individual at any given time”3. 
While Young’s own solution to this problem is to grant specific representation 
to these subgroups within the institutions in which social groups exert their 
                                                    
1 Brian BARRY, ”Essentialism and Multiculturalism…cit.”, p. 284. 
2 Iris Marion YOUNG, ”Difference as a Resource for Democratic Communication”, in James 
BOHMAN, William REHG (eds), Deliberative Democracy. Essays on Reason and Politics, MIT Press, 
Cambridge (Mass.), 1997, pp. 383-406. 
3 Adam James TREBBLE, ”What is the Politics of Difference?”, Political Theory, vol. 30, no. 2, 
April 2002, p. 267. 
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group-differentiated representation rights, that is not the same, Trebble argues, as 
granting these subgroups some special representation within the larger public. 
And we have here, indeed, the possible asymmetry of the burdens of justification 
(in the form of arbitrarily differential ”special” representation rights) that consti-
tutes the third critique mentioned below. 
Of course, not all theorists of multiculturalism attach the same ”primordial” 
dimension to group differences. It is reasonable to conceive of a scale of such as-
sumptions, varying from truly primordialist accounts to more open-ended and 
multifaceted accounts of how identities are formed and the role they play in any 
conception of toleration and justification. 
It may be confusing and even unfair to associate every theorist of multicultur-
alism or of ”the politics of difference” with a commitment to a primordialist view 
of cultural identities, but at the same time it is important to pay close attention to 
Barry’s charge that there is present in many of these theories a hidden logic of cul-
tural essentialism. Barry’s forceful claim is that such a de facto hidden logic exists. 
We may add that when such logic is present, it steers the conception in question to-
wards a form of structural over-inclusivity that renders it problematic. 
Justificatory Asymmetry 
There is an apparent ambiguity concerning the drive towards group-differen-
tiated rights. There is, first, the question related to the reason, or justification, of 
each of the rights under discussion. That involves weighing the legitimacy of the 
claim for having some different, and not equal, rights recognized across particular 
groups. The other question, not completely separated from the first one, is related 
to the actual entity that can be said to enjoy these rights. 
Group-differentiated rights may mean either rights that apply for the individ-
ual members of some group, or indeed group-rights, that is, rights claimed by the 
group itself and not by the individual members of the group, but on behalf of 
them. That may entail either their protection from alienation form their own cul-
ture and assimilation in the larger society, or the protection of the distinct identities 
themselves, as singular cultural forms and ways of life that are transmitted 
through generations within the group. This difference between rights of members 
and rights of groups is crucial, I argue, for one reason because there is still a funda-
mental problem and a difficulty for modern political theory to envisage, as rights 
bearers, anything other that persons, individuals, citizens. 
Of course, states, institutions, agencies, political authorities in general may be 
said to have a right to issue authoritative directives, potentially coercively im-
posed, by virtue of their being legitimate such authorities. Political legitimacy en-
tails the existence of a right to issue such directives, and there is, in most political 
theories, considered to exist also a corresponding duty or obligation to obey, on be-
half of their subjects. Hence, political legitimacy and political obligation may be 
such two elements of a relation connecting conceivable rights of non-individual en-
tities, to obligations attributed to individuals. 
However, the institutions of the modern liberal democratic state and the vari-
ous social (ethnic, cultural, religious) groups that are the focus of the literature on 
multiculturalism and group rights, are hardly comparable entities. The question 
of political legitimacy, as it is conceptualized regarding the state’s right to issue 
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authoritative directives, and especially the conditions that are considered to be 
necessary for such a right to be justified, have no conceivable correspondent and 
application when compared to a social groups’ relation to its members, or a 
church’s relation to the followers of the faith in question. 
The way in which ”internal restrictions” (to use the vocabulary suggested by 
Will Kymlicka) are in fact defined and applied within certain cultural, ethnic, and 
(especially) religious groups, has no correspondence with the present justificatory 
burden that the liberal tradition imposed on the state. The frequent contradictions 
within such groups is an indicator of the incoherence of any political theory which 
bestows rights to composite entities within which the definitions of the cultural 
identity, religious precepts, and ethnic filiations are subject to the same pluralism 
as the wider society. 
This represents a principled argument, as opposed to an argument from fact. 
The simple evidence that such groups sometimes impose unjustified coercion upon 
their members – usually by means of exclusivist readings of ancient texts or tradi-
tions – does not represent by itself a sufficient counter-argument to the defense of 
group-differentiated rights. One would just as well direct comparable evidence 
against the liberal democratic justificatory accounts. That is not, however, enough 
in order to invalidate the reasons for such commitments. The principled argument 
presented here is rather the one which points to the internal incoherence of the 
theoretical stance of the defenders of group based rights. The basic difficulty in-
volved in this critique is that of an unwarranted inconsistency across the several 
levels of political justification. 
Since the central focus here is on the elements of a coherent account of political 
justification, there is an obvious requirement that whenever the same circum-
stances for justification are said to be met, the same justificatory approach – or at 
least the same normative requirements – should be deployed. Thus, when discuss-
ing the need of political justification, the various accounts which ground it on the 
non-voluntary aspect of membership into political communities, have to respond 
to the same reasons, whenever these apply. 
In any definition of a social group (including Iris Young’s definition), it is pre-
cisely the non-voluntary aspect of membership that is emphasized and considered as 
central. It represents one of the aspects of what makes a social group different from 
voluntary associations, in Young’s view. One ”finds himself”, in Young’s words, as a 
member of a group he never actually chose to enter. That kind of membership may 
correspond, in an important measure, to some objective features (skin color, gender, 
age) – but it is never that feature itself that is significant. Instead, what is significant 
is a set of identifications from non-members and self-identifications by the members 
themselves, a process of acknowledging that there is a particular identity, a set of 
practices or cultural forms – perceived by others and by the members themselves. 
That distinctive identity has constituted the reason for various structural or deliber-
ate forms of discrimination or oppression, by other groups or the wider society. 
However, whatever the definition and characterization of the dimensions of 
membership in such social groups, there is never a burden of justification toward 
their members that can be reasonably compared with the requirements of political 
justification as we now normally conceive them. This represents one of the main 
problems highlighted in the present argument, an argument regarding the funda-
mental difficulty of conceiving non-individual entities as holders of rights. 
Since membership in a social group thus defined, and membership in a po-
litical community, are both de facto non-voluntary, unavoidable, un-chosen, and 
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moreover, affect individuals’ lives in ways that find no equivalent in voluntary as-
sociations, it follows that the political and quasi-political relations which character-
ize such memberships need to be justified in a similar way. 
Once we placed such a huge burden of justification on the state and its main 
institutions, the ensuing legitimate right to use coercive power and impose duties 
to citizens under specified conditions cannot, normally, be a weaker right than a 
potential right of groups to impose duties on their members. In addition, when the 
state and the institutions in question are liberal, then it follows that the illiberal 
groups in a society cannot normally enjoy broader rights than the liberal state’s in-
stitutions themselves. 
Of course, the argument is rather complex, but its main lines should be by 
now salient. It is in this context that we can understand the difficulty posed by 
what I call the political form of the paradox of toleration. When the differential in 
justificatory burdens is visible, the political theorist has to find some reasons for 
that difference. Justificatory asymmetry, here, could be defended only by an argu-
ment which appeals to some overriding value of the preservation of cultural iden-
tities – something which few theorists, if any, are prepared to explicitly make. Oth-
erwise, in the absence of the presupposition that survival of cultural identities is 
more important than equal rights to political justification – whenever the ”politi-
cal” context of justification is present, i.e., including at the level of social groups – 
the asymmetry cannot be defended. 
The presence of justificatory asymmetry within the various accounts of multi-
cultural policies or ”the politics of difference” makes visible the underlying as-
sumption that the preservation of given – but in a certain way, arbitrarily defined – 
identities overrides the claims for equal rights to political justification. The often 
associated prejudices or the inherent incentives for radicalism generated by the 
process of forced definition of these identities are revealed when analyzing the 
more complex situations of self-identification (discussed above) or the alternative – 
potentially equally biased – administrative identification of the identities to be pro-
tected. The problem, therefore, is created not only by the claim itself that preserva-
tion of identities has preeminence over equal individual rights to political justifica-
tion; in addition, the definition of the identities is a complicated process which 
may involve a questionable degree of arbitrariness. 
Furthermore, there is another possible argument against group-differentiated 
rights that relates to the first point of ambiguity identified above: what exactly 
does it mean to say that groups have rights by virtue of having distinct identities, 
or by virtue of they representing the necessary conditions for the survival of cer-
tain cultural forms, and that without such protections (specific group rights), these 
identities would disappear or would be dramatically undermined? What, in other 
words, would be the possible reasons for such rights? 
Why indeed protect through guaranteed exemptions certain dimensions of 
”cultural” interpretations and practices, why insulate them from possible internal 
and external criticism and debate? The worth of some cultural practices and tradi-
tions is perhaps difficult to be measured within a tradition which, for some time 
now, praises or at least allows a significant degree of critical reflection to accom-
pany social practices. But similar contradictions and tensions existed at various 
moments in the affirmation of critical individualism, personal liberties, the rule of 
law, etc, and there is no reason why some political engineering should be deployed 
today to protect other cultures. 
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Both Charles Taylor and I.M. Young are right that mis-recognition is indeed a 
form of re-essentialization. The conundrum arises when realizing that the move 
from explaining it to prescribing group-based policies cannot be made without it 
involving in fact the same logic of re-essentialization. I recall here some examples 
from Susan Moller Okin’s provocative essay1 on the compatibility between femi-
nism and multiculturalism. 
The three critiques (related to structural over-inclusiveness, cultural essentialism 
and the asymmetry of the burdens of justification) illustrate the considerable difficul-
ties that characterize attempts to extend the limits of toleration, and by that the limits 
of public justification without a clear understanding of the circumstances in which 
theories of toleration risk be internally inconsistent. The politics of difference also 
fails to offer a better account on how the underlying common framework of tolera-
tion and respect for diversity can be fostered and preserved, when the focus shifts to-
wards identity difference, rather than diversity. The reasons themselves for valuing 
pluralism and diversity seem to be radically undermined within such an approach. 
 
                                                    
1 Susan MOLLER OKIN, ”Feminism and Multiculturalism: Some Tensions”, Ethics, vol. 108, 
no. 44, July 1998, pp. 661-684, and IDEM, ”Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women”, in Joshua 
COHEN, Matthew HOWARD (eds.), Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1999.  
